Following revelations from families about some U.S. service members aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln struggling with mental health after 250 days without a port visit, sailors, retirees and lawmakers told Military Times that troops were absorbing consequences of longtime flaws within the sea service that have been worsened by the current conflict.

The Navy has struggled for years to meet high operational tempo demands, they said. Deployments are regularly extended, scheduled maintenance is missed and the shipbuilding pace remains glacial, leading to delays in delivery and an undersized fleet.

The issues have spanned multiple presidential administrations but have been compounded by the handling of the Iran war and ensuing military operations, sources said, leading to dire circumstances for some sailors.

Leaders have disputed the descriptions of deteriorating conditions aboard the Lincoln and denied reporting about quality-of-life concerns.

Asked recently by reporters about families’ concerns over the length of the deployment, President Donald Trump dismissed the question, saying that it’s “not nearly long enough.”

Asked about those same concerns, Adm. Daryl Caudle, the service’s chief of naval operations, told Military Times, “Sailors first is not a slogan — it’s a warfighting imperative.”

“The sustained pace of operations in the Middle East has only reinforced that taking care of our sailors and maintaining combat readiness are inseparable,” Caudle said.

‘We need more ships’

Following outcry about conditions aboard the Lincoln, the Navy moved the Nimitz-class carrier USS George Washington from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, where it arrived Wednesday. The ship is reportedly replacing the Lincoln, which will now steam toward its homeport of San Diego.

The move temporarily leaves the western Pacific without a U.S. aircraft carrier, the presence of which is a key part of the U.S. military’s effort to deter China in the South China Sea and reassure regional allies.

Operational tempo concerns, meanwhile, are nothing new for the service, according to retired Vice Adm. Fozzie Miller, who served as commander of U.S. Fifth Fleet and U.S. Central Command from 2012 to 2015.

Miller joined the Navy in 1979. From his early days in uniform, the service’s goal, he said, was to operate at a level that was neither too harsh for the individual sailor nor too unbearable for the equipment vital to mission success. An adequate number of warships was integral to maintaining that balance.

“We could use more carriers or less [operational] tempo,” Miller said. “It’s one or the other, but we’re a global Navy with global responsibilities, and so if we’re going to fulfill those, we need more ships.”

Rear Adm. Thomas Moore, who led the Navy’s acquisition program and went on to become commander of Naval Sea Systems Command, told Congress in 2013 that the service is “an 11-carrier Navy in a 15-carrier world.”

The demand is unlikely to dwindle, he said.

Thirteen years since Moore’s statement, the Navy is still at 11 carriers. With the USS Nimitz scheduled to retire at the end of next year, that number may soon be 10.

The USS Harry S. Truman and USS Gerald R. Ford are currently sidelined for maintenance after deployments, the latter of which notched a post-Vietnam record 326 days at sea in May after it was extended to support operations in the Middle East. The Nimitz-class USS John C. Stennis is undergoing a years-long overhaul.

The USS Ronald Reagan, also a Nimitz-class, is expected to be deployable by the end of August after a 17-month repair period. The Nimitz-class USS George H.W. Bush is in the Middle East.

“We just don’t have enough aircraft carriers right now in this rotation to sustain all the things we want to do, and I think this is a long-standing problem,” said Steven Wills, a Navy surface warfare officer who retired after 20 years.

In 2014, the Navy began implementing the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, or OFRP, deployment model, which places maintenance, training, evaluations and a single eight-month deployment within a 36-month cycle.

The service says the framework is intended to produce a more comprehensively manned and trained force while providing predictability to deployment schedules for sailors and their families.

In 2016, however, the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that heavy operational demands led the Navy to increase ship deployment lengths and reduce or defer ship maintenance.

Those decisions made deployments less predictable, ate into training time, contributed to declining ship conditions and increased the time ships required for much-needed maintenance.

From fiscal 2014 through 2019, Navy ships spent more than 33,700 additional days in maintenance beyond intended scheduling, leading to fewer vessels available for training or operations.

An upended supply network

While the Navy has long struggled with carrier availability, current U.S. leadership has created more operational tempo issues through poor planning and insufficient wartime support, according to lawmakers and a sailor who deployed in support of the Iran war.

“Logistics was a complete failure the entire time out there — food, supplies, parts,” said the sailor, who served aboard an Independence-class littoral combat ship and was granted anonymity due to fear of reprisal.

Iranian attacks damaged the Navy’s longstanding logistics hub in Bahrain in February, disrupting the regional supply network supporting ships operating in the Middle East.

The Navy shifted the new logistics hub to Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, an atoll in the Indian Ocean that sits more than 2,000 miles away from the service’s carrier strike groups in the Middle East.

Diego Garcia’s distance proved to be problematic, the sailor said, with the hub requiring the LCS to place a food order 30 days in advance.

Those orders were nearly impossible, however, with an influx schedule exacerbated by poor planning, the sailor added. Sailors were unable to resupply from the hub, instead grabbing whatever could be salvaged from replenishment-at-sea oilers.

“There’s no excuse for why, if we’re at war, we can’t get an expedited food order,” the sailor said.

Rep. Mike Levin, D-Calif., told Military Times that the logistical issues described by the sailor were due to preparation failures.

“I’ve spoken to a lot of people who’ve been deployed, and you know, the basic problem seems to be that if they were going to use Bahrain as a hub to restock, to get food and to provide rest and all that,” Levin said. “If that was the idea, well, clearly that didn’t work out. After February, March — [the administration] should have thought of that.”

‘People can break, too’

At least two sailors attempted to jump overboard from the USS Abraham Lincoln, families of Lincoln sailors previously told Military Times.

While the individual mental circumstances of the incidents remain unknown, the frantic operational tempo of combat operations inevitably takes a natural toll on service members, according to one sailor who has deployed to the Middle East aboard an aircraft carrier during the current conflict.

“Just like machines, people can break, too,” said the service member, who was granted anonymity for fear of reprisal from leadership. “They need rest.”

Time to rest was not always available. Losing sleep was sometimes part of ensuring safety.

If equipment broke, sailors would, at times, work well beyond normal shifts until it was fixed. In some instances, completion of the task could mean the difference between life and death.

In a 2021 review, the GAO found that just 14% of Navy officers surveyed slept at least seven hours per night during a recent deployment, while 67% reported five hours or less. GAO also found that the Navy routinely assigned fewer sailors to ships than workload studies indicated were needed to safely operate them.

By 2023, surface-fleet sailors were averaging 5.25 hours of sleep every 24 hours, below the Navy’s standard of providing at least 7.5 hours of sleep opportunity. GAO identified crew shortfalls and mattress problems as challenges to managing fatigue.

For its part, the Navy has implemented measures to try to address the issue, including initiating a study involving about 1,600 sailors wearing Oura rings to monitor sleep and other biometric indicators while underway.

But lack of sleep, according to personnel, has been just one detriment experienced during the conflict with Iran. Service members have also faced food shortages onboard the carrier, the sailor said, with quality that fluctuated between bad and horrible.

“It was either undercooked, overcooked or unrecognizable at all,” the sailor said.

As extensions piled on, a decline in morale took on a recognizable tone at the phone center or in conversations at the galleys. Humor darkened even more than usual, and port visits meant less and less.

“These things have been happening on deployments for always,” said Parker Moore, a nuclear reactor operator who served aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln before its recent deployment. “It is bad, but it is always bad.”

During Moore’s time on Lincoln, the stigma surrounding mental health remained prevalent. There were mental health professionals aboard the ship, but if a sailor sought help, the service member could be taken off their job.

“They’re terrified to disappoint the people around them,” Moore said. “If I don’t do my job, there’s only 30 people who can do it, right? So now there’s only 29 people.”

Following the report on mental health issues aboard Lincoln, the Navy said it had not observed an increase in suicidal ideation or suicide attempts. The service did note, however, that additional counselors and resources were being sent to the crew.

Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command, visited Lincoln on Saturday and issued a statement claiming that the ship had the lowest number of mental health cases among the Navy’s 11 active aircraft carriers.

Lack of transparency

The Pentagon under the Trump administration has become increasingly tight-lipped over the information it provides to Congress.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth released a memo in October 2025 informing Defense Department personnel, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorization was required for any communication to leaders on Capitol Hill.

Hegseth also dodged several questions from lawmakers during a July Senate hearing on the Iran War.

When Sen. Jon Ossoff, D-Ga., asked the Pentagon leader whether previous statements about Iran’s military being “destroyed” and “made combat ineffective” were true, Hegseth declined to answer.

Hegseth has also not held a Pentagon press briefing about the Iran war for more than 100 days, with the last coming on May 5.

To alleviate concerns over short-term problems with current military operations like those aboard the Lincoln, Congress must be able to carry out oversight, lawmakers said.

Rep. Betty McCollum, D-Minn., told Military Times that the Pentagon should be sharing information that would allow political leaders to assess whether the president and defense secretary were deploying assets in the most mission-effective way.

Invoking the War Powers Resolution would allow lawmakers to hold the current administration accountable, some Democrats have argued.

The resolution requires the executive branch to notify Congress within 48 hours of deploying military forces and allows lawmakers to enforce the removal of military forces within 60 to 90 days unless Congress has declared war or authorized military force.

Levin supports that approach, he said, and asked that his Republican colleagues stand up and ask tough questions.

Republican members of the House and Senate armed services committees did not respond to Military Times’ requests for comment.

“I think back to George W. Bush,” Levin said. “I disagreed wholeheartedly with Iraq, but you think about the steps that he took. You think about … Secretary Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney, others — their consistent engagement.”

For the LCS sailor, planning deficiencies are already rearing their head.

Though the ship did assist with the Navy’s blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, turning away more than a dozen vessels, it will now be sidelined longer than scheduled because of deferred repairs.

It is one example, the sailor said, of there being no long-term plan for ship rotations.

“‘We’re gonna keep you out here,” the sailor said of the impression made on them, “until your ship can’t operate or function anymore.’”

The goal is to create a variant of the SeaSparrow that can be used by the 12 nations in the NATO SeaSparrow Project Office consortium, or NSPO, according to the Navy Sources Sought notice. The deadline is Oct. 19.

The NSPO is looking for a weapon that can be employed against a wide variety of threats. The NSV SeaSparrow “should have capability against current and future threat classes spanning a variety of threat characteristics including velocity (low-speed to high-speed), altitude (sea skimming to high diver), maneuverability (non-maneuvering to high Gravitational (G)-Force maneuvers), and signatures,” the Navy said.

The NSV is also meant to defend the fleet against massed salvos of missiles and function despite jamming.

The weapon “should be able to work in complex natural, contested, Radio Frequency (RF), Electro-Optical (EO), and/or Infrared (IR) environments.”

“The missile should have the capability to discriminate and resolve between multiple closely spaced targets and provide threat-track measurements to support missile guidance, navigation and lethality functions,” the Sources Sought notice continues. “The missile should have the capability to handle threat countermeasures.”

The notice included a graphic that appeared to depict surface ships — including two aircraft carriers — being targeted by a dozen missiles and torpedoes, plus a hostile fixed-wing aircraft and a helicopter. The friendly ships appeared to be using active illumination to paint some threats, while the SeaSparrow used its on-board sensors to intercept others.

NSPO seeks a modular, open-source design that would give the U.S. government “maximum rights in technical data, computer software, and computer software documentation (including source code), design artifacts, and interface specifications.”

“This approach will simplify future upgrades, promote interoperability across consortium platforms, and outpace evolving threats,” the notice said.

The NSPO wants contractors who can provide a complete missile system, including airframe, propulsion, guidance and software. The missile should have no more than a 10-inch diameter and fit inside a Mark 41 vertical launch tube.

The Sources Sought notice emphasized that the missile and its technical data should be releasable to the entire NATO SEASPARROW Consortium: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the U.S. Other users include Thailand and the United Arab Emirates.

The Block II RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow is currently manufactured by Raytheon, which doubled production to more than 350 missiles in 2025. Amid naval operations in the Persian Gulf, where Iran has launched numerous missiles and drones against dwindling stocks of U.S. and allied interceptors, future demand for short-range air defense weapons is likely to be brisk.

First fielded in 2004, the Evolved SeaSparrow is descended from the 1950s AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided air-to-air missile.

Though the original Sparrow had a mixed combat record as an aerial combat weapon in the Vietnam War, the Evolved SeaSparrow was intended as a low-cost defense against anti-ship missiles, aircraft, helicopters and fast attack boats. The current version has an estimated range of around 30 miles.

In May, acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao announced during a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing that the MQ-25A was moving into the low-rate initial production and deployment phase.

The aircraft is intended to relieve the Navy’s F/A-18 Super Hornets of the aerial refueling role, freeing up F/A-18E/F aircraft to focus on strike missions.

The memo, dated April 21, 2026, was recently published by the Pentagon within a Modernized Selected Acquisition Report. It was first reported by The War Zone.

The report notes that in March 2026, the USS Theodore Roosevelt Unmanned Air Warfare Center “became the first fully operational/deployable MQ-25 capable aircraft carrier,” with another UAWC aboard the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan slated “to be operational/deployable at the end of [August] 2026.”

The Nimitz-class carrier USS George H.W. Bush was the first aircraft carrier on which the UAWC was installed and tested back in August 2024.

According to the Navy, the integrated Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System and the MD-5E Ground Control Station are the systems required for the MQ-25 air vehicle command and control — and are critical to the unmanned aircraft refueler’s operations.

In May, the Stingray reached milestone C, which in the defense acquisition process authorizes a program to transition from the engineering and manufacturing development, or EMD, phase into production and deployment, a process that in this instance has been nearly eight years in the making.

Inked in 2018, the $805 million Boeing-Navy contract covered the design, development, fabrication, test and delivery of four Stingray aircraft, a program that the service at the time estimated would cost about $13 billion for 72 aircraft, according to previous Military Times coverage.

Despite its first test flight running a year later than previously planned, on April 25 the Stingray inched closer to operability after completing an approximately two-hour flight around Mascoutah, Illinois.

With the USS Theodore Roosevelt in the fold and able to support MQ-25 operations, deploying the unmanned refueling drone is seemingly only a matter of time.

SensorMAX, developed by Lockheed Martin, uses AI and machine learning to analyze acoustic sensor data, update the sensor model — and then immediately transmit the updates over the air to anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, platforms.

During RIMPAC maneuvers near Hawaii, Navy MH-60R helicopters dropped sonobuoys, which fed data to SensorMAX. It in turn assisted the crews with target identification.

“Ground operators retrained SensorMAX’s models on new sounds in minutes, then transmitted AI-enhanced undersea intelligence OTA [over the air] using an encrypted data link directly back to the helicopter and the fleet,” according to a Lockheed Martin news release.

Lockheed described the system as the “Navy’s AI portable sonar expert.”

“Taking in subsurface acoustic data from a network of sensors, SensorMAX provides a continuous data stream to the aircrew and sends information to the ground station,” the company continued. “When a new target is identified, system operators label the identified noise signature, retrain the model on the new data and push a small update packet back to the aircrew.”

The system allows aircrews to manage up to eight simultaneous sonobuoy surveillance feeds, “doubling the capacity of legacy capabilities,” Lockheed said.

The company estimated that each retraining cycle for the model takes under five minutes.

SensorMAX integrates data from a variety of sensors, which makes it useful for air and ground operations as well as naval, according to Lockheed Martin.

“Lockheed Martin’s collaboration with FUSE Inc. enables secure, resilient software delivery to deployed aircraft, allowing SensorMAX’s trained AI models and mission software to be updated rapidly without interrupting operations,” the company said.

“By demonstrating platform-agnostic AI intelligence and classification, the future fleet can leverage any acoustic sensor to expand the protective ring around high-value assets and accelerating the ASW kill chain,” Lockheed Martin continued.

China is also integrating AI into ASW. Chinese media claimed last year that researchers had developed AI which evaluates data from multiple sources, including sonobuoys as well as data on water temperature and salinity.

The Trump administration in December announced its intention to build a new class of large surface combatants, designated as the Trump-class guided missile battleship.

If built, the 35,000-ton nuclear battleship, according to the report, will be the most heavily armed surface vessel the U.S. Navy has ever built, possessing anti-air, land-attack and anti-ship missiles, hypersonic missiles, nuclear cruise missiles, large lasers and a rail gun.

“If built to those specifications, the ship would be the largest surface combatant in the world and larger than any surface combatant built for the Navy since World War II,” according to the report. “It would be more than three and a half times the size of the Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer and more than twice the size of the Zumwalt-class guided missile destroyer.”

The Navy projects that between 2028 and 2056 it will build 15 Trump-class guided missile battleships, with the subsequent 14 costing $18 billion each. By contrast, the USS Gerald R. Ford, the U.S. Navy’s premier nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, cost approximately $13.3 billion.

By 2058, the total tonnage of “large surface combatants to be constructed would need to increase by 60 percent,” which the report notes “could be a challenge for the shipbuilding industry.”

The shift away from small surface combatants would mean that by 2035, shipyards would need to produce 12% greater tonnage under the 2027 plan than under the 2025 version, according to CBO’s estimation.

To keep pace with the service’s aims, the Navy would need to build a battleship about every other year from 2028 to 2056, the report notes, while continuing to produce two DDG-51 destroyers per year.

Last March, the Government Accountability Office released a report detailing nearly two decades of lackluster progress in U.S. shipbuilding. According to the GAO, not enough ships have been built, newly constructed ships are failing to function as expected and ships are being delivered up to three years later than ordered.

In a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Shelby S. Oakley, a director at GAO, said that unrealistic expectations of costs and timing have diverted resources and introduced delays in shipbuilding, with the result that Navy programs and shipbuilders have been “effectively made to operate in a perpetual state of triage.”

The report also notes that while the price tag will be immense up front, over time, by switching to nuclear power, it would reduce the battleship’s operating costs by eliminating the need to purchase fuel. The GAO did not provide an estimate of possible savings.

Since the December announcement, the cost of Trump-class battleships has been a moving target, with the updated $23.4 billion roughly six billion more than the initial Navy projection.

Just a little over two weeks after U.S. Central Command utilized three Corsair unmanned surface vessels to strike a submarine and ship maintenance facility at the Bandar Abbas naval base in Iran, marking the “first time American forces have employed sea drones in combat operations,” the Navy confirmed its first live-fire training exercise of its Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft uncrewed surface vessel.

Two former U.S. warships, the amphibious assault ship USS Peleliu and the cruiser USS Mobile Bay, were sent below the seas off the coast of Hawaii during a live sinking exercise, or SINKEX, event during the biennial Rim of the Pacific exercise.

On July 24, the Navy released footage of the sinking, including the USV targeting the hull of the USS Peleliu.

Sarah Weinstein, a surface warfare officer currently serving as the first Commanding Officer of Unmanned Surface Vessel Division 32, confirmed that her division, USVDIV-32, was behind the execution of the Navy’s first GARC live fire.

“It was incredible to watch my team execute with precision and we were thrilled to provide a perspective of the former USS Peleliu that often isn’t often captured in a SINKEX,” the officer wrote on LinkedIn.

The sinking, which took place on July 17, found the GARC at the center of the Peleliu SINKEX. Created by the Baltimore-based BlackSea Technologies, the company touts the GARC as the “most proven tactical sUSV on the water.”

With a payload capacity of up to 1,000 pound and a range of 700 nautical miles at a speed of 22 knots, BlackSea writes that the 16-foot GARC “combines modular payload flexibility, advanced autonomy, and rugged endurance.”

In addition, operators can control the vessels individually or as a swarm. It’s driven manually or given a target to follow by using radar.

In August 2025, the Navy announced that it was “experimenting with the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft (GARC)” to support naval operations. And just last month, USVDIV-32 utilized the drone boats during Exercise BALTOPS 2026, one of NATO’s premier maritime exercises.

“We are at the beginning and we don’t even know where we’re going to take it yet,” Weinstein told The Wall Street Journal in June. “The GARC originally was designed to kind of do a limited skill set, and we’ve turned it into something that can do escort, that can do surveillance, intelligence, maritime domain awareness, and we’ve already with one platform been able to expand what is in the realm of possible.”

Now, with its hand in sinking the USS Peleliu, the GARC continues to surpass its testing milestones as it inches its way toward operational deployment.

Defense leaders ordered the mine hunter Fulda and the support vessel Mosel to redeploy from Djibouti, a European and international naval hub at the southern mouth of the Red Sea, to the eastern Mediterranean, the Ministry of Defense announced on Thursday. The ships and crew will hold there and await further instructions about whether an international Hormuz mission will come to pass at all.

After the U.S-Israeli war against Iran began in late February, European nations pledged to assign naval vessels to a multinational mission for securing shipping in the economically vital Strait of Hormuz, over which Iran claims control. A precondition for such a deployment, governments here said, was that the conflict would ebb to such a degree that none of their ships would come under fire in a war many here consider pointless.

The prospect of a “permissive environment” is now deemed slim by Berlin, the Ministry of Defense announcement reads, as open hostilities have broken out again between Iran and the United States following a period of calm.

Aside from the geopolitical aspect of the redeployment, there is also a more mundane rationale, Navy officials acknowledge: The two vessels’ cooling systems, which rely on sea water, were not built for the high temperatures of the Gulf of Aden environs. The eastern Mediterranean will be a more suitable parking spot for the ships, constructed decades ago with operations in the North Atlantic and Germany-adjacent waters, the hope goes.

The redeployment of the Fulda and the Mosel has been “coordinated with international partners,” the ministry statement reads, as the vessels await an opportunity to tag along with a beefy air-defense escort to make the journey to the Mediterranean. On the way to Djibouti in June, the British air-defense destroyer Dragon provided protection through the Red Sea leg of the voyage.

“I can imagine Trump will criticize the move as a lack of staying power in the region,” said Sebastian Bruns, a fellow at the Royal Swedish Society for Naval Sciences (KÖMS), about the German naval redeployment plans.

But fellow European nations will understand it, as they all are puzzled by the dizzying pace of U.S. President’s Donald Trump’s proclamations variously trumpeting military strikes and prospects of some kind of peace deal, sometimes at the same time, he said.

Bruns criticized the German government for jumping on a bandwagon of “Symbolpolitik” in the first place — taking action only for the envisioned signal of aiding the Americans in some form even though the security context was unclear.

“For such highly specialized units as mine hunters, that role must feel like a waste for the crew,” he said.

The German Ministry of Defense said it will continue to keep the Fulda and the Mosel deployable for a future Strait of Hormuz operation, with officials eying “durable indications for a near-term start” of such a mission.

EU member states have authorized Operation Atalanta, the union’s counter-piracy naval mission off the Horn of Africa, to begin conducting flag-verification boardings of vessels suspected of belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet in the western Indian Ocean. The decision, announced this week by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, extends to Atalanta a power already exercised by the EU’s Mediterranean mission, Operation Irini.

Kallas made the announcement alongside news that Irini forces had boarded the sanctioned oil tanker MV South Star on July 20, acting on suspicion that the vessel was sailing under a false flag. “Every illicit voyage helps sustain Russia’s war machine. We are matching our sanctions with action at sea,” Kallas said, adding that the Atalanta authorization “further tightens the net.”

The move considerably widens the EU’s geographic reach against the shadow fleet, a loosely defined network of tankers with opaque ownership structures that Moscow uses to sell oil above the Western-imposed price cap. While Irini patrols the Mediterranean, Atalanta operates across the Somali Basin, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba and waters around Oman, and was launched as the EU’s first-ever naval mission in 2008 to combat piracy.

It is separate from the EU mission ASPIDES, which is designed to protect shipping in the Red Sea from attacks by the Iran-backed Yemeni Houthi rebels.

The corridor where the mission operates is a critical transit route for tankers carrying Russian crude toward buyers in Asia. Brussels has already sanctioned more than 600 vessels suspected of belonging to the network.

Generally, ships on the high seas cannot simply be stopped and boarded by any third country. However, Article 110 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea permits warships to stop and inspect a vessel only where there is reasonable suspicion it is stateless or flying a flag to which it is not entitled. This falls short of a blanket authority to stop any sanctioned or Russia-linked ship, but flying false flags has been a frequent practice on Russian shadow fleet vessels.

The council decision, the operational plan and the rules of engagement that would spell out exactly how far Atalanta’s new powers extend have so far not been made public.

The approach has already produced results elsewhere. Irini’s flag checks contributed to pressure that culminated in a Cameroon purge of 39 vessels from its shipping registry after investigators uncovered fraudulent paperwork and fake registry websites used to disguise shadow fleet tankers.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously denounced such interceptions as “piracy,” underscoring how the expanded mandate is likely to further sharpen tensions between Brussels and Moscow over enforcement at sea.

The Navy recently published a Sources Sought notice for a massive, multi-award contract — worth up to $30 billion — for the multi-mission dry dock.

The dock is part of the Navy’s Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, which aims to modernize the service’s four long-neglected shipyards at Portsmouth, Virginia, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Kittery, Maine, as well as the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance Facility. The contract is for five years plus three one-year options.

“The Multi-Mission Dry Dock is a fully pressure-relieved dry dock capable of accommodating shipyard repair services for the newest Ford-class aircraft carrier, Nimitz-class carriers, and other surface and subsurface ships served by PSNS & IMF,” according to the Sources Sought notice.

The project was spurred by the need to service Ford-class carriers on the West Coast.

“The Navy does not currently have the capacity and capability to perform depot-level maintenance on a Gerald R. Ford-class carrier in the Pacific Northwest,” according to the Navy’s Multi-Mission Dry Dock website.

The capability to even service older carriers is limited at Puget Sound: “The only dry dock on the West Coast able to accommodate a current Nimitz-class aircraft carrier is Dry Dock 6 (DD6), which does not meet seismic resiliency standards and cannot fully accommodate Ford-class carriers,” the site reads.

The multiple-award construction contract, or MACC, includes several task orders that typically range between $2 billion and $6 billion each. However, there may be smaller task orders for early contractor involvement and alternative technical concepts.

“The focus of this MACC will be the construction of a new proposed Multi-Mission Dry Dock at PSNS & IMF, located at Naval Base Kitsap (NBK) Bremerton, Washington,” the Sources Sought notice said. Located within the existing Dry Dock 3 and Piers 6 and 7, the project includes “dry dock drainage, dewatering, and flooding systems; a caisson; roadways and rail networks; portal crane track; access and egress elements; mechanical, electrical, and communications systems; support buildings; and utility routing tunnels. The proposed project also includes demolition of facilities and utilities.”

The Navy expects the first task order to include dredging, as well as work on piers, buildings and utilities. The second task order will see demolition of Dry Dock 3 and construction of the multi-mission dry dock. Task order three will provide infrastructure, such as electrical substations, utility tunnels and building crane rails. Task order four will be for the dock caisson.

Puget Sound has been a fixture for the Navy for more than a century.

It began in 1891, when the Navy bought 190 acres for $10,000 (about $367,000 today) to create Naval Station Puget Sound. The station became a shipyard in 1900 and was the Navy’s only West Coast repair facility until 1941.

“Between 1917 and 1969, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard constructed a total of 85 ships, including the largest vessels on the West Coast,” the Navy said.

In addition to problems stemming from both the destroyers and the missiles, the Navy and Army are reportedly not coordinating work on the joint Conventional Prompt Strike missile program. Missile flight testing scheduled for 2025 has been pushed back to 2027.

“Despite recent successes testing the CPS missile, the Navy faces several programmatic challenges associated with developing, delivering, and deploying the CPS missile on the DDG-1000,” warned the Government Accountability Office report. “These challenges include rising costs, schedule delays, reliability issues with DDG-1000 class destroyers, and CPS production challenges, among other things.”

In search of a mission for the DDG-1000 after escalating costs and capability concerns resulted in the program being cut from 32 ships to just three, the Navy decided in 2022 to arm the Zumwalts with CPS boost-glide hypersonic missiles. CPS uses a two-stage booster to loft a high-altitude glider that can hit a target thousands of miles away in 30 minutes or less.

Two Zumwalts have been delivered, and the third is scheduled for 2028. In addition, CPS missiles will arm Virginia-class attack submarines, while the Army uses a land-based version called the Land-Range Hypersonic Weapon.

However, modifications to the destroyers — such as installing hypersonic missiles and vertical launch tubes — has added costs and delays.

One ship, for example, needed “more cabling than was anticipated in the initial project design, as the contractor cut and removed more cabling than planned from the forward part of the ship for CPS missile launch tube installation,” GAO noted.

In addition, “the DDG-1000 class ships have unique systems, such as its radar, combat, and network systems, that are costly and difficult to sustain and maintain,” GAO said.

The Zumwalts suffer from unreliable power systems and difficulty in obtaining spare parts.

Despite some successful flight tests from land facilities, the CPS missile has also run into problems.

The cost of the missiles has risen sharply: a 2020 Navy estimate of $31 billion for 262 missiles has mushroomed into $41 billion for 224 missiles.

“Lockheed Martin, the CPS missile body prime contractor responsible for production integration, faces significant production issues that it must address to build the missiles at anticipated rates and costs,” said GAO.

There have been problems with heat-resistant coatings, substandard parts and insufficient production capacity, with the factory only capable of producing six or seven missiles a year instead of the desired 12.

Building the CPS missile has also proved too complex for some workers.

“According to Navy and Army program officials, the work instructions are largely written as engineering specifications, which the contractor provides to workers who have recently graduated from high school or vocational school,” the GAO report noted. “Navy production oversight officials said that it is unreasonable to expect workers to understand the instructions provided.”

In theory, the Army should have an easier time with its LRHW missile, which mainly differs from CPS in the launcher. Rather than the cold-gas ejection system that pops CPS from a tube before ignition, LRHW uses a hot-launch system.

However, GAO pointed out a concerning lack of coordination between the two services. For example, while the Navy is responsible for production of the missile body, the Army used its own consultant to study how to increase production.

Thus, “the Navy cannot make decisions in isolation since the Army is buying its own missiles and manages key aspects of production,” the report concluded. Without a joint development and procurement strategy, “the Navy and the Army create the potential for both additional delay and inefficient use of taxpayer funds.”